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OF TROLLS, DAVIDS, GOLIATHS, AND KINGS:
NARRATIVES AND EVIDENCE IN THE
LITIGATION OF HIGH-TECH PATENTS
COLLEEN V. CHIEN**
While each patent dispute is unique, most fit the profile of one of
a limited number of patent litigation stories. A dispute between
an independent inventor and a large company, for instance, is
often cast in "David v. Goliath" terms. When two large
companies fight over patents, in contrast, they are said to be
playing the "sport of kings." Some corporations engage in
"defensive patenting" in order to deter others from suing them.
Patent licensing and enforcement entities who sue have been
labeled "trolls." Finally, observers of the patent system call the
use of patent litigation to impose or exploit financial distress
"patent predation. "
These stories, routinely invoked by the press, advocates, and
academics, shape public understanding of the patent system. In
this Article, I describe, then match, these stories to data on patent
litigations to determine which types of suits are most prevalent. I
focus exclusively on the litigation of high-tech patents-covering
hardware, software, and financial inventions-using data from
the Stanford Intellectual Property Clearinghouse for cases
initiated in U.S. District Courts from January 2000 through
March 2008.
The data shows that the reality is more complicated than the
rhetoric regarding patent litigation suggests. For instance, many
blame nonpracticing entities ("NPEs") for a majority of the
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problems with the patent system. But they bring only a minority
of patent suits: 17% of high-tech patent suits in the last eight
years. However, NPEs often name multiple defendants and
sometimes, rather than sue, are sued, for declaratory judgment
("DJ"). Counting suits based on the number of defendants and
including DJ cases, the NPE share rises to 28% of all high-tech
patent suits. This average reflects an increase in NPE suits as a
proportion of all suits over an eight-year period, from 22% in
2000-2001 to 36% in 2006 to March 2008, counting defendants,
or from 10% to 20%, counting cases. I also report the variation
by industry based on the absolute number of suits-the share of
hardware patent NPE suits (26%) was nearly triple that of
financial patent NPE suits (9%). These numbers provide a
richer context for understanding the NPE phenomenon.
Another widespread perception of the patent system is that large
companies dread going to court, carefully constructing portfolios
of patents to avoid doing so. The practice of "defensive
patenting" has been well-documented and theorized. Yet, I
found that public and large private companies initiated 42% of
all lawsuits studied, 28% of the time against other large
companies-the largest single category. They also defend against
many other suits, brought by NPEs, small inventors, and
individuals. These data suggest that defensive patenting, which is
supposed to keep large firms out of court, is at least an
incomplete-and perhaps a failing-strategy for many
companies.
This Article also reports on the other major narratives of patent
litigation. 4% of the suits were initiated by individual inventors
(David v. Goliath), 18% of the suits were brought by small
private companies against public or large private ones (small v.
large), 16% pit one small- or medium-sized company against
another (limited stakes), and in 8% of the suits, a large firm sued
a small one (predation profile). These and other findings
provide a snapshot of patent litigation that should both inform
current efforts to reform the patent system and serve as a basis
for further investigation into its functioning.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent litigation has alternatively been called the sport of kings'
and the business of sharks.2 Some observers of the patent system are
troubled by patent wars, like the multi-patent, multi-venue, multi-
million dollar dispute between wireless kings Qualcomm and
Broadcom.3  Others see the rise of aggressive and opportunistic
1. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical
Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (citing Douglas J.
Kline, Patent Litigation: The Sport of Kings, TECH. REV., Apr. 28, 2004,
http:l/www.technologyreview.com/business/13562/).
2. Markus Reitzig, Joachim Henkel & Christopher Heath, On Sharks, Trolls, and
Other Patent Animals-'Being Infringed' as a Normatively Induced Innovation
Exploitation Strategy 2 (Working Paper, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=885914.
3. In just one of its suits, for example, Qualcomm was ordered to pay Broadcom over
$8.5 million for discovery abuses. Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L. Byman, Qualcomm Case
Sends Tremors Nationwide, LAW.COM, Jan. 31, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/legal
technology/pubArticeLT.jsp?id=1201687552037. Yet that number pales in comparison to
the reported $11.1 billion in revenue that Qualcomm received in the 2008 fiscal year in
royalty payments from patent licenses. Press Release, Qualcomm, Inc., Qualcomm
Announces Fourth Quarter and Fiscal 2008 Results (Nov. 6, 2008), available at
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enforcement of patents by non-practicing entities ("NPEs") against
established businesses to be the real bane of the patent system.4 Still
others lament the so-called "explosion" of patent litigation across the
board and in different industries, because it may discourage, rather
than encourage, innovation.'
Stories like this shape public understanding of the patent system.
Commentators note, for instance, that popular sentiment has turned
against NPEs to such a degree that "the epithet [patent troll] is now
commonly bandied about in courts and the halls of Congress."6 In the
popular media, in contrast, independent invention and independent
inventors are widely celebrated. The reality TV show American
Inventor and movie Flash of Genius7 put a positive face on innovation
and its protection, through the patent system. Indeed, many believe
that protection of the small inventor provides the best yardstick of
how well the patent system is working.'
Which account of the patent system is correct? Or, to be more
precise, to what extent does each story describe the patent litigation
landscape? Surprisingly few, if any, studies answer this question.
Although each type of patent litigation has been studied
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/QCOM/ 407452927x0x247758/4797c963-2646-43de-
bef4-391b3752ea2b/QCOMQ408ERFINAL.pdf.
4. Chris Coletta, Red Hat Among Companies in Crosshairs of License Suit,
TRIANGLE BUS. J. (Raleigh, N.C.), May 16, 2008, at 7, available at
http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/ stories/2008/05/19/storyl3.html.
5. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion 28-29
(Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 05-18, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=831685 (describing how patent litigation may interfere with the
innovation incentive, the avowed purpose of the patent system).
6. Ronald S. Katz, Shawn G. Hanson & Omair Farooqui, Patent Trolls: A Selective
Etymology, IP LAW 360, Mar. 20, 2008, available at http://www.manatt.com/uploadedFiles/
News andEvents/ArticlesByUs/patentroll.pdf. But the term arguably masks the
reality that each patent litigation has at least two sides. Critics of the term "troll," for
instance, believe it masks "big businesses' use of public relations to solve operational
problems." Raymond Niro & Robert Greenspoon, Are Patent Trolls Really Undermining
the Patent System?, IP LITIGATOR, Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 13, 16. Likewise, when an
individual inventor sues a corporation, the corporation is more likely to see the inventor as
a crank than a heroic independent inventor. I am thankful to Matt Sag for making this
point to me.
7. American Inventor (ABC television broadcast 2006-2007); FLASH OF GENIUS
(Intermittent Productions 2008).
8. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 165 (2008).
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independently,9 no systematic attempt has been made to place the
various types within the context of all patent litigations.10
This gap in understanding is problematic. Even if many think
that NPEs are a problem, no one really knows the size of the
problem.1" Similarly, when a new patent war is started, it is difficult
to know whether it represents the occasional, large patent fight or
instead demonstrates the routine use and, some would argue, abuse of
the patent system. More importantly, by focusing on problems
associated with one or two types of patent litigation, other problems
may be overlooked. Although the "squeakiest wheel"-that is, the
patent story that gets the most attention-may deserve the grease,
without data, it's hard to be sure.
Yet understanding the prevalence of each patent litigation story
is important, as each has its own culprit and call to action. Those who
bemoan the rise of NPEs, for instance, have called for limits to the
ability of patent holders to sue in inconvenient venues.12 However,
such a change would be made at the expense of patentees who benefit
from patent law's broad jurisdiction rules.13 Proponents of damages
reform, on the other hand, argue that the current law does not
properly account for the increasingly complex and overlapping nature
of rights in technology products.14 They complain that this has
allowed patentees to command disproportionately large royalties,
which are passed on to consumers.15 Those who oppose change, in
9. See infra Parts I.A.1-6 (describing research on each of these patent stories).
10. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 1, at 27 (stating that more research on patent
litigation is needed).
11. The estimates range from 5% in 2000 and 2002 to 12% in 2008. See infra text
accompanying notes 54-55.
12. See, e.g., Daniel McCurdy, Patent Trolls Erode the Foundation of the U.S. Patent
System, SCI. PROGRESS, Fall & Winter 2008/2009, at 84-85 (describing the case for venue
reform).
13. See, e.g., Letter from Ron Reardon & Louis Hoffman, Nat'l Ass'n of Patent
Practitioners, to Harry Reid, Senate Majority Leader, and Mitch McConnell, Senate
Minority Leader (Dec. 27, 2007), available at http://www.napp.org/resources/NAPP-
OppTo2007 SenateBill.pdf (criticizing venue reform as "weakening" patents).
14. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 1991, 1994 (2007), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edulSHAPIRO/
stacking.pdf (purporting to illustrate that "royalty stacking can become a very serious
problem, especially in the standard-setting context where hundreds or even thousands of
patents can read on a single product standard" and proposing reform of the methods for
calculating reasonable royalties).
15. See generally id. (examining the phenomenon of royalty stacking, which occurs
when a single product is subject to multiple patents, and its effect on consumers).
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contrast, believe that such cases are rare and that the system should
be left alone.
16
This Article puts these concerns into context by identifying the
major stories of patent litigation and then matching actual suits, based
on party profile, to these stories. Using data from the Stanford
Intellectual Property Litigation Clearinghouse ("IPLC"), 17 launched
publicly in December 2008, and drawing upon related empirical
research, it attempts to answer two questions: who initiates patent
lawsuits, and what types of suits are the most common? Unlike
earlier studies of patent litigation, it tracks not only the number of
cases filed, but also the number of defendants sued. It also takes into
account declaratory judgment cases where the positions of patentee
and infringer are reversed. In so doing, this Article presents a
snapshot of patent litigation that should both inform current efforts to
reform the patent system and serve as a basis for further investigation
into its functioning.
This Article focuses on the litigation of high-tech (also referred
to as computer-related) patents, covering hardware, software, and
financial inventions. The high-tech community has been one of the
most active in pushing for congressional patent reform"s and the
source of many important innovations. Patenting behavior in each
high-tech industry has been the subject of considerable academic
study, providing a rich background to the current effort. 19 Part I
reviews this background, identifying the dominant patent litigation
narratives. Part II describes the data and methods that were analyzed
16. See Innovation Alliance, Our Principles, http://www.innovationalliance.net/about-
us/our-principles/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2009) (holding as a principal that "The Current
Law Regarding the Determination of a Patent's Value is Appropriate").
17. Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse, http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/
centers/iplc/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2009). The Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse data is
derived from PACER, an electronic service that allows users to obtain case and docket
information from federal courts. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, PACER
Service Center, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2009). After
downloading all available cases from more than ninety courts (and by hand-collecting and
scanning documents from others), raw data sets are parsed by a computer program into
specific motions, objections, and decisions. The data is then hand-checked by research
assistants to ensure integrity. Access to the IPLC database can be requested by emailing
jwalker@law.stanford.edu.
18. See Coalition for Patent Fairness, Overview, http://www.patentfairness.org/
learn/about/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2009). The Coalition, which describes itself as
"committed to the passage of patent legislation that will foster innovation and economic
growth," includes high-tech companies such as Apple, Cisco Systems, Dell, Google, HP,
Intel, Mircron Technology, Inc., Microsoft, Oracle, Palm Inc., RIM, SAP, and Symantec.
Id.
19. See infra Part I.A.
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to develop a patent litigation landscape based on these narratives.
Part III reports my results, summarizing who brings computer-related
patent lawsuits and which types of patent litigations narratives are
most prevalent. Part IV discusses the implications of my empirical
findings.
I. BACKGROUND
While each patent dispute is unique, most fit the profile of one of
a limited number of patent litigation stories. When an independent
inventor sues a large company, for instance, a David v. Goliath
match-up results.2" In contrast, if the parties are more evenly
matched, comprising two large private or publicly traded
corporations, the result can be patent warfare, potentially of global
dimensions.21 To avoid such wars, many companies defensively build
their patent portfolios in an attempt to reach patent d~tente.22
Notwithstanding these efforts, many find themselves in court, across
the courtroom from an NPE.23  Finally, the strategic use of patent
litigation by well-established large companies against their smaller,
less-established rivals has been called predatory.24
A. Different Types of Narratives
1. NPE Suits
Since the term was coined in 1991,21 trolls, or NPEs, have become
perhaps the most controversial and least popular group of patent
plaintiffs.26  The term NPE generally refers to a patentee that does
20. See Jim Offner, ITC to Hear Profs David v. Goliath Patent Case, E-CoMMERCE
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2008, http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/62247.html.
21. See Seoul, Nichia Settle Global LED Patent War, LAW 360, Feb. 3. 2009,
(describing the international "patent war" between Seoul Semiconductor Co. Ltd. and
Nichia Corp., including patent and defamation suits in the United States, Europe, Japan,
and Korea).
22. See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 1 (2005) (describing how firms accumulate portfolios of patents to improve
their defensive position).
23. See infra Part I.A.1.
24. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 1, at 14.
25. Timothy J. Hailer & Sally Wiggins, The Patent Troll Myth, in IP VALUE 2006, at
113 (2006), available at http://www.buildingipvalue.com/06homeindex.html.
26. Indeed, NPEs are also called names such as patent extortionist, patent terrorist,
and blackmailer. Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the
Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1810 (2007) (blackmailer); Hailer &
Wiggins, supra note 25, at 113 (patent extortionist), Richard Wilder, Perspective: How to
Fight Against Patent Terrorism, CNET, Jan. 6, 2005, http://news.cnet.com/How-to-fight-
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not make products or "practice" its inventions. Over time, the
definition has been narrowed to exclude actors in the innovation
enterprise who engage in significant research and development
activities27 and individual inventors who seek to commercialize their
inventions," While definitions vary, the term NPE in this Article
refers to a corporate patent enforcement entity that neither practices
nor seeks to commercialize its inventions. This definition excludes
certain inventors whom others have called trolls, in particular,
individual inventors who initiate suits.29 Part II.E, infra, describes the
differences between individual inventors and trolls, and why I did not
include all such plaintiffs in the NPE category.
In support of the NPE business model, companies have been
formed to engage in diverse activities such as organizing patent
auctions, acquiring patent assets, asserting patent portfolios, and
underwriting enforcement activities.3" Proponents of the patent
against-patent-terrorism/2010-1014_3-5513518.html (patent terrorist). But see Hailer &
Wiggins, supra note 25, at 113-16 (arguing that NPEs are not necessarily bad just because
they do not manufacture the technology that is embodied by the patents they enforce); see
also James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll. An Alternative View of the
Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 201 (2006) (calling
NPEs the less offensive term "patent dealers").
27. See, e.g., Mark Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls? 18 (Stanford Pub. Law
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 980776, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=980776 (concluding that universities are not patent trolls; they are non-practicing
entities). Research and licensing companies like Tessera, http://www.tessera.com/ (last
visited Apr. 29, 2009), and Rambus, http://www.rambus.com/us (last visited Apr. 29, 2009),
have also been excluded from the term NPEs.
28. See McDonough, supra note 26, at 189 ("A patent troll is a person or entity who
acquires ownership of a patent without the intention of actually using it to produce a
product.").
29. For example, one Tobi Kay Gellman apparently brought a patent suit against a
number of security companies in Marshall, Texas. See Gellman v. ADT Sec. Serv., Inc.,
No. 2:07-CV-0282, 2008 WL 4280351, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2008). My definition does
not include this as a troll patent suit, though at least one blogger has, stating:
Toby Kay Gellman of Dallas, Texas is the trustee of the Mayer Michael Lebowitz
patent trust. No injunction is sought-just money for a patent involving using
cellular technology in alarm systems. I guess if your love [sic] one dies and leaves
you just a handful of patents, that could be more valuable than you think.
Troll Cases Pouring Into Eastern Texas, AGORACOM, Aug. 6, 2007, http://agoracom.com/
ir/patriotlforums/discussion/topics/147635-troll-cases-pouring-into-eastern-exas/messages/
569392.
30. See Peter N. Detkin, Presentation at FTC Hearing on the Evolving IP
Marketplace: To Promote the Progress ... of Useful Arts, Investing in Invention (Dec. 5,
2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplaceldec5/docs/pdetkin.pdf;
see also Raymond Millien, Presentation at FTC Hearing on the Evolving IP Marketplace:
The IP Marketplace Players (Dec. 5, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/
LITIGATION OF HIGH- TECH PA TENTS
licensing community emphasize the "central role [licensing plays] in
helping commercial entities obtain the rights to use valuable
technologies that produce new and beneficial products., 31 For some
individual inventors and small companies, NPEs have served as
"guardian angel[s], '32 providing a path to liquidity previously
unavailable.33
Who do NPEs sue and what form do their suits take? NPEs have
a reputation for surprising their targets, typically mature companies
that have already developed and sold allegedly infringing products. 34
NPEs also typically target multiple defendants and seek settlements. 3
For every defendant that is actually sued, many more demands are
made. 36 Because NPEs have no products of their own, they cannot be
countersued for patent infringement. 37 NPEs do not risk disruption to
their core business-patent enforcement is their core business.38
workshops/ipmarketplace/dec5/docs/rmillien.pdf (describing further the diversity of patent
licensing and enforcement business models).
31. John C. Paul, D. Brian Kacedon & Michael V. O'Shaugnessy, Patent Trolls: A
Stereotype Causes a Backlash Against Patents and Licensing, 41 LES NOUVELLES 224, 232
(2006).
32. Lisa Lerer, Meet the Original Patent Troll, LAW.COM, July 20, 2006,
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=900005550324.
33. See Richard Reisman, "The Six Phases of a Technology Flop" ... Patents, and
Plan B, May 6, 2008, http://www.teleshuttle.comUCM/2008/05/six-phases-of-technology-
flop-patents.html ("[T]he patent as Plan B provided the hedge that made it easier to
justify the risks inherent in developing my ideas and starting the Teleshuttle business. In
my case that hedge paid off-after 12 years!"); infra Part I.A.4 (describing the evolution of
Burst.com).
34. See Reitzig et al., supra note 2 (describing "troll surprise").
35. See McCurdy, supra note 12, at 80; infra Part IV.A.
36. See, e.g., Lerer, supra note 32 (describing one NPE as sending "hundreds of nearly
identical letters to allegedly infringing companies," then "su[ing] 50 companies for patent
infringement"); Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive
Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REv. 509, 516-17 (describing the example of E-
Data, that allegedly sent 75,000 demand letters resulting in several licenses and a suit
against forty-one companies).
37. McCurdy, supra note 12, at 81.
38. Lemley, supra note 27, at 8 (asserting that trolls do "not contribut[e] anything to
society, but rather obtain[] and assert[] patents covering technology independently
developed by" others).
2009] 1579
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Some accuse NPEs of asserting weak patents,39 the validity of
which is unlikely to be decided by a court. This follows from a
business model based on generating licensing revenue rather than
getting an injunction to prevent defendants from making or selling
their products. Patent holding company Intellectual Ventures, for
instance, holds and has attempted to license large numbers of
patents.4" If a fraction of these attempts succeed, a revenue stream
can be developed without resort to litigation.41 It is unknown how
many NPEs use such a portfolio approach, however. Research
company Patent Freedom believes that the majority of NPEs are
more selective and strategic,4" acquiring relatively smaller numbers of
strong, not weak, patents that can withstand invalidity challenges.43
NPEs have focused on high-tech inventions for several reasons.4
First, they have historically acquired their patents from distressed or
bankrupt companies, principally casualties of the Internet bubble.45
Second, products in computer and semiconductor-related industries
tend to be covered by many patents, increasing the likelihood of
39. See Sarah Lai Stirland, Trolling for Patents, SEATTLE TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 14,
2005, http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20051114&slug=
patentl4 (characterizing patents asserted by NPEs as "broadly written patents with
questionable claims" examined by "harried, time-starved patent examiners"); see also Rob
Garretson, Intellectual Security: Patent Everything You Do, Before Someone Else Does,
CIO INSIGHT, Dec. 5, 2005, http://www.cioinsight.com/c/a/Trends/Intellectual-Security-
Patent-Everything-You-Do-Before-Someone-Else-Does/ (stating that trolls may be
encouraged to "move on to easier targets" when large companies utilize their own
"arsenal of patents" as a weapon).
40. See Amol Sharma & Don Clark, Tech Guru Riles the Industry by Seeking Huge
Patent Fees, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Sept. 17, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB122161127802345821.html (stating that Intellectual Ventures "has quietly amassed a
trove of 20,000-plus patents" and "ranks among the world's largest patent-holders").
41. See Patent Freedom, Current Research: Largest Patent Holdings,
https://www.patentfreedom.com/research-phl.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Patent Freedom, Current Research: Most Pursued Companies,
https://www.patentfreedom.com/research.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2009) (showing that
high-tech companies such as Matsushita, Sony, and Toshiba dominate the list of most
pursued companies); Patent Freedom, Current Research: Product Categorization,
https://www.patentfreedom.com/research-pc.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2009) (showing that
high-tech product categories such as semiconductors, software, consumer electronics, and
software dominate the patent acquisitions).
45. See Robin M. Davis, Failed Attempts to Dwarf the Patent Trolls: Permanent
Injunctions in Patent Infringement Cases Under The Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005
and Ebay v. Mercexchange, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 431, 431 (2008); J.P. Mello,
Technology Licensing and Patent Trolls, 12 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 1, 2 n.26 (2006); Joe
Beyers, Perspective: Rise of the Patent Trolls, CNET NEWS, Oct. 12, 2005,
http://news.cnet.com/ rise+of+the+patent+trolls/2010-1071_3-5892996.html.
[Vol. 871580
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infringement.46 Finally, in high-tech or "predictable arts," it is
arguably easier to file a paper patent47 that can be bought and sold
free of the underlying technology. In contrast, biotechnology
inventions have more stringent enablement and written description
standards4" that are more difficult to meet without having actually
made the invention.
However, the role of NPEs in other industries is poised to
expand. As the patent marketplace evolves, so likely will business
models to support the enforcement or licensing of biotech and other
inventions.49 In addition, in an economic downturn, startups and
companies in all industries are more likely to attempt to cash in their
patents by selling them to patent enforcement entities, rather than let
them sit on the shelf.50
A few attempts have been made to quantify the size of the NPE
phenomenon. In 2007 and 2008, a website, Patent Troll Tracker,51
tracked newly-filed troll litigations across the country.52
Unfortunately, this effort was discontinued when the site was the
subject of a defamation lawsuit.53 Ball and Kesan released a study in
46. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 2025-28.
47. A paper patent is a patent covering an invention that exists only on paper, and the
invention has not been made or operated.
48. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1173-74 (2002) (describing the "stringent disclosure
standard" applied to biotechnology patents); Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in
the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 136-38 (2008).
49. Indeed, NPE Intellectual Ventures describes its portfolio as spanning
biotechnology and medical device inventions. Intellectual Ventures, Who We Are,
http://www.intellectualventures.com/about.aspx (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
50. See, e.g., William-Arthur Haynes, More Business Eye Mining IP Stash for Cash,
SILICON VALLEY/SAN JOSE Bus. J., Nov. 21, 2008, available at
http://sanjose.bizjournals.com/sanjose/stories/2008/11/24/story3.html (describing sale of
patents to raise funds "in a down economy").
51. The Patent Troll Tracker website is no longer available to the public and can only
be accessed by invited users. Patent Troll Tracker, http://trolltracker.blogspot.com/ (last
visited Apr. 29, 2009). Selected pages have been archived at http://people.ffii.org/
-zoobabfbh.udev.org/filez/swpat/TrollTracker/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
52. See The Prior Art, Patent Troll Tracker Speaks-and Vows to Return,
http://thepriorart.typepad.com/the-prior-art2008/O5lpatent-troll-tr.html (May 8, 2008,
12:52 EST) (describing the Patent Troll Tracker website as published between May 2007
and February 2008)
53. Mike Masnick, Troll Tracker Sued For Defamation By Patent Attorneys In East
Texas, TECHDIRT, Mar. 12, 2008, http://techdirt.com/articles/20080312/020814510.shtml.
The defamation case involved a post on the website claiming that a patent lawsuit was
filed the day before the patent was issued. As of May 2009, the case was still pending.
ESN LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 5:2008cvOO20, Justia Federal Court Filings and Dockets,
http://dockets.justia.com/docket/court-txedce/case-no-5:2008cvOO020/case-id-107885/ (last
visited Apr. 29, 2009).
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2008 estimating that 5% of suits in 2000 and 2002 were brought by
patent licensing firms. 4 Patent Freedom has placed the share of NPE
suits higher, at approximately 12% in 2008.55 Others claim that the
number is much lower, closer to 2%.56 Without a shared
understanding, it is not clear which of the following claims is true:
that NPEs "represent the most significant and destabilizing change in
the patent environment since 2003, '5 or that, "based on the statistics,
it's not obvious that there's a problem at all.",58
2. Litigation-Avoidance/Patent D6tente
Others who watch the patent system tell another story: that
companies are engaged in defensive patenting. By building portfolios
of patents, companies can discourage or neutralize threats of suits
brought by their competitors. 59 This strategy compels firms to patent
now in order to avoid litigation later. Instead, the hope is that
companies in both industries, well-armed, will reach a patent standoff,
or d6tente. As a Sun Microsytems executive put it in 2005, "[i]f you
build up your patent portfolio, I build up mine-nukes pointing at
each other .... That has exactly the right outcome. We sit here and
exchange patents with each other."60
Scholars have documented the defensive patenting phenomenon
in the semiconductor industry." They have also noted the
54. Gwendolyn G. Ball & Jay P. Kesan, Transaction Costs and Trolls: Individual
Inventors, Small Firms and Entrepreneurs in Patent Litigation 13 (2008) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
55. See Patent Freedom, Current Research: Litigations Over Time,
https://www.patentfreedom.com/research-lot.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
56. Nathan Myhrvold, Inventors Have Rights, Too!, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2006, at
A14 ("Court records show that only 2% of all patent lawsuits are due to plaintiffs that
have no ongoing product business. Of that 2%, the vast majority are perfectly legitimate
companies or universities. A tiny minority of patent suits are due to bad actors, but it's
hardly a crisis.").
57. McCurdy, supra note 12, at 78-79; see also Coletta, supra note 4 ("Trolls are
widely perceived ... as the bane of the patent system."). For a survey of academic articles
on the subject, see Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent Trolls:
A Novel "Cold Fusion" Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 407, 442-48 (2007); John F. Luman III & Christopher L. Dodson, No Longer a
Myth, the Emergence of the Patent Troll: Stifling Innovation, Increasing Litigation, and
Extorting Billions, 18 INTELL. PROP. TECH. L.J. 1, 1-2 (2006); Daniel J. McFeely, An
Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights of Those Who Misuse the U.S. Patent System to
Earn Money Through Litigation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 289, 289-90 (2007).
58. Stirland, supra note 39.
59. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 22, at 36.
60. John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEo. L.J. 435, 469 n.147 (2004).
61. See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, An Empirical Analysis of
Patent Litigation in the Semiconductor Industry 3 (July 30, 2008) (unpublished
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accumulation of large patent portfolios in industries that obtain
mostly software patents, namely the computer, electronics, and
instrument industries.62 Financial industries have also witnessed a
"patent flood," or rush to patenting, observers claim, in order to
avoid damaging litigation.63 The desire to avoid patent litigation may
explain why companies in the semiconductor industry obtain patents
even while rating them as ineffective relative to other ways of gaining
advantage.' 4 The companies that engage in defensive patenting tend
to be large. This makes them vulnerable to patent litigation but also
gives them the ability to underwrite large patent portfolios.
Despite the importance of defensive patenting strategies among
high-tech companies, the share of suits involving hardware and
software inventions has actually risen, not declined. According to
Hall and Ziedonis, the probability that semiconductor firms will be
involved in lawsuits as targets of litigation grew from close to 0% in
1973 to close to 10% in 2001.66 Bessen and Meurer likewise note that
the percentage of suits involving software patents as compared to
overall suits has risen, from less than 5% in 198467 to 26% in 2002.68
These observations raise the question: why do companies who
acquire patents in order to avoid being in court nevertheless end up
there? It is unclear whether greater activity by NPEs, a failure of
defensive patenting, growth trends in the industry, or something else
is to blame.
manuscript), available at http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/-bhhall/papers/HallZiedonisO7
PatentLitigationAEA.pdf ("Evidence from our prior study suggests that the patent
reforms led capital-intensive firms in [the semiconductor industry] to 'ramp up' their
patent portfolios more aggressively-largely to reduce litigation risks.").
62. See James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents 4
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 03-17/R, 2004), available at
http://www.researchoninnovation.org/swpat.pdf.
63. See, e.g., John Squires, Vice-President, Chief Patent Counsel & Associate General
Counsel, Goldman Sachs & Co., Remarks at the Berkeley Roundtable of Patentable
Subject Matter (Oct. 3, 2008).
64. Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent
(or Not) 5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at
http://www.dklevine.con/archive/cohen-survey.pdf.
65. Allison et al., supra note 60, at 468-69.
66. Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 61, at 1.
67. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 191-92.
68. Id.
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3. Sport of Kings
When large corporations sue each other, the result can be patent
warfare, involving competing claims, multiple patents, and teams of
lawyers. Patent litigation is complicated, risky, and expensive. In
cases in which $1 million to $25 million is at stake, the cost of
litigation averages between $2 and $3 million.69 When more than $25
million is at stake, the average cost jumps to $5.5 million. 7° Given
such price tags, it is no wonder that patent litigation among large
companies has been called the sport of kings.7'
The patent battles between Creative and Apple, as well as
Qualcomm and Broadcom, provide two examples. At the time of
trial, the litigants were competitors in the marketplace: Creative and
Apple sell rival mp3 players, while Qualcomm and Broadcom both
make chipsets for cell phones that operate on 3rd generation, or
"3G," networks.72 In both cases, numerous litigations were filed in
district court and at the International Trade Commission 73 and
involved claims and counter-claims. 74 The Apple suit was settled for
69. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. L. ASS'N, LAW PRACTICE MGMT. COMM., REPORT
OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2007, at 1-91 (2007).
70. Id.
71. See Kline, supra note 1.
72. Susan Decker & Connie Guglielmo, Apple, Creative Are "Open to Settlement" of
Suits, BLOOMBERG, Jul. 5, 2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087
&sid=aSC.LVCARdr4; Gina Keating, Qualcomm Barred from Using Broadcom 3G
Patents, REUTERS, Dec. 31, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/
idUSN31590 63420080101.
73. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 3:05CV01958 (S.D. Cal. filed Oct. 14,
2005); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No.3:05CV03350 (D.N.J. filed July 1, 2005);
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 585 F.Supp.2d 1187 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (filed May 18,
2005); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 8:05CV00468 (C.D. Cal. filed May 18,
2005); Creative Technology Ltd. v. Apple Computer Inc., No. 4:06CV3218 (N.D. Cal. filed
May 15, 2006); In the Matter of Certain Portable Digital Media Players, Notice of
Investigation, Inv. No. 337-TA-573 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n June 8, 2006); Certain
Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power
Control Chips, and Products Containing Same, Including Cellular Telephone Handsets,
Notice of Investigation, Inv. No. 337-TA-543 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n June 21, 2005).
74. For example, in the dispute between Apple and Creative, Creative initiated an
investigation against Apple for the alleged infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,928,433. See
Certain Portable Digital Media Players, 71 Fed. Reg. 34,390 (June 8, 2006) (notice). Then,
Creative was countersued by Apple in the International Trade Commission ("ITC") for
allegedly infringing U.S. Patent Nos. 7,046,230, 5,341,293, 5,898,434, and 6,282,646. See
Certain Portable Digital Media Players and Components Thereof, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,421
(June 29, 2006) (notice). Likewise, Broadcom first sued Qualcomm for patent
infringement, asserting violations of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,374,311, 6,714,983, 5,682,379,
6,359,872, and 6,583,675 in the Central District of California and the ITC. See Certain
Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power
Control Chips, and Products Containing Same, Including Cellular Telephone Handsets, 70
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$100 million,75 while the Qualcomm and Broadcom dispute continued
for several years and recently settled for $891 million.76 Yet suits
between large firms may not be strictly competitive in nature. Hall
and Ziedonis describe a case in which a large, ailing company
mounted an aggressive patent enforcement campaign against other
firms just prior to filing for bankruptcy,77 well after the company had
ceased to be a viable competitor.78
Though impressive in its size and complexity, litigation between
large firms is not perceived to be the norm.7 9  Relatively few
companies can afford to engage in such all-out patent wars, and many
who end up in court disclaim any desire to be there.80 One would
therefore expect patent battles between large companies to be the
exception rather than the rule.
4. David v. Goliath
A David v. Goliath suit pits individual inventors against large
corporations accused of profiting from the inventors' technology.
Such suits are portrayed as countering the attempt of corporations to
"fight down the inventor and rob him of all the benefits of his
invention."'" They build upon America's love of entrepreneurs82 and
Fed. Reg. 35,707 (June 16, 2005) (notice); Ashlee Vance, Broadcom Broadsides
Qualcomm with Wireless Chip IP Lawsuit, CHANNEL REG., May 19, 2005,
http://www.channelregister.co.uk/2005/05/19/broadcom-suesqualcomm/. Qualcomm then
countersued in the Southern District of California, accusing Broadcom of infringing six
patents pertaining to integrated circuits used in GSM phones and infringing another
patent relating to semiconductor chips for Wi-Fi devices. Grant Gross, Qualcomm Sues
Broadcom over Patents, NETWORK WORLD, July 11, 2005, http://www.networkworld.coml
news/2005/ 071105-qualcomm.html.
75. See Press Release, Apple, Inc., Apple & Creative Announce Broad Settlement
Ending Legal Dispute Between the Companies (Aug. 23, 2006), available at
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2006/aug/23settlement.html.
76. See Press Release, Qualcomm Inc., Qualcomm and Broadcom Reach Settlement
and Patent Agreement (Apr. 26, 2009), available at http://www.qualcomm.com/newsl
releases/2009/090426_qualcommbroadcomsettlement.html.
77. Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 61, at 17.
78. Id.
79. Kline, supra note 1 (noting patent owners fear legal fees).
80. See NetApp Sues Sun for ZFS Patent Infringement, Dave's Blog, Sept. 05, 2007,
http://blogs.netapp.com/dave/2007/09/netapp-sues-sun.html (describing how NetApp had
no choice but to sue Sun for declaratory judgment of infringement of NetApp's patents
after Sun halted communication); Mosaid Settles Samsung Patent Litigation, DESIGN &
REUSE, Jan. 18, 2005, http://www.design-reuse.com/news/9487/mosaid-settles-samsung-
patent-litigation.html (quoting the MOSAID Technologies CEO: "[w]e prefer to settle
licenses in the boardroom, but we will pursue our rights in court if necessary").
81. 13 CONG. REC. 3952 (1882).
82. Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property Law, 45
Hous. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (2008).
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the iconization of American inventors-men and women idealized for
their "ingenuity, productivity, and creativity."83
The 2008 movie "Flash of Genius" popularized one archetypal
David, independent inventor Robert Kearns, who accused Ford
Motor Company and others of stealing his idea for the intermittent
windshield wiper.' Kearns ultimately received millions of dollars in
royalty payments.85 The David v. Goliath story is compelling, not
only to moviegoers, but to juries as well, who favor individual
inventors at a rate of three to one over the corporations they sue for
patent infringement.86
According to several studies, individuals and small companies
are more likely than large companies to sue on their patents.87 This is
particularly true in the financial industry, where patents assigned to
individuals are an estimated five times more likely to be litigated than
those held by public corporations. 88  The intermediary market for
patent enforcement discussed above supports this litigiousness by
underwriting litigation that might otherwise be unaffordable for
individual inventors.89 It also further blurs the distinction between
small company, or underdog inventor, and troll.
Take, for example, the case of tech startup turned patent
enforcement company Burst.com, founded by individual inventor
Richard Lang." According to one account, though the company
initially tried to commercialize and market Lang's network
83. Kimberly Moore, Populism and Patents, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 69, 69 (2007).
84. John Seabrook, The Flash of Genius, NEW YORKER, Jan. 11, 1993, at 38, available
at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/1993/01/11/199301_11 038_TNYCARDS_000
363341; FLASH OF GENIUS (Intermittent Productions 2008); Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 32
F.3d 1541, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
85. Seabrook, supra note 84, at 38.
86. Moore, supra note 83, at 85 n.50 (2007) (stating that in such match-ups juries rule
in favor of independent inventors 74% of the time and defendant corporations only 26%
of the time).
87. See Allison et al., supra note 60, at 439 ("[P]atents issued to individual inventors
and small companies are more likely to be litigated."); Josh Lerner, The Litigation of
Financial Innovations 15 (Harvard Univ. & Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 09-027, 2008), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/09-027.pdf ("Patents
assigned to individuals are five times more likely to be litigated than those held by public
corporations, and about 50% more likely to be so than those held by private firms (which
include both smaller operating firms and patent holding companies).").
88. See Lerner, supra note 87, at 15.
89. See supra Part I.A.1.
90. See Peter Burrows, Underdog or Patent Troll?, BUS. WK., Apr. 24, 2006, at 58; see
also Niro & Greenspoon, supra note 6, at 14-16 (describing how International Meta
Systems, Inc.'s failure in the marketplace, due to the allegedly predatory practices of Intel,
resulted in the sale of the patent to licensing company TechSearch); Reisman, supra note
33 (blogging about the demise of his company leading to enforcement of his patents).
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transmission technology, it ran into competitive obstacles.91 After
obtaining a $60 million settlement from Microsoft for infringement of
its patents, Burst.com decided to turn to patent enforcement full-
time, trimming its staff from 110 employees down to two.9 2 Should
Burst.com be characterized as a troll or an underdog? I would argue
that when the company stopped trying to commercialize its
technology and started focusing on enforcement, it went from being
an underdog to being an NPE. A tougher case is presented by an
individual inventor who is represented by a contingent fee lawyer.
Though the individual inventor may present the face of the litigation,
the underwriter may in fact control the litigation.
While such cases do make it difficult to distinguish between
NPEs and underdogs, NPE suits and individual inventor suits differ in
important ways. First, some independent inventors are perceived as
seeking not only money, the main objective of licensing shops, but
also justice or vindication by a court.93 In addition, an independent
inventor is likely to present a more compelling plaintiff to a court
than a licensing shop assignee. Finally, an individual with fewer
resources is likely to be more selective, both about its targets and the
patents it asserts, as compared to an NPE with relatively deeper
pockets and a large portfolio.
The number of David v. Goliath type suits is unknown.
Individual inventors, once a dominant source of new inventions, now
generate only 12% of patents.94 Once obtained, these patents may be
harder to enforce by an individual who lacks the financing and
resources to monitor for infringement.95 Still, along with the classic
story of the American inventor,96 the David v. Goliath narrative
remains an important part of the patent litigation landscape.
5. Predation
The strategic use of patent litigation by established companies to
impose distress on their financially disadvantaged rivals has been
called patent predation.97 Such litigation can damage a defendant's
91. See Burrows, supra note 90, at 61.
92. Id.
93. See Seabrook, supra note 84, at 38.
94. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 169.
95. Meurer, supra note 82, at 1233-34 (describing the obstacles faced by small firms
in enforcing patents, which also extend to independent inventors).
96. See Moore, supra note 83, at 69.
97. Jean 0. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary
Injunctions, 44 J.L. & ECON. 573, 573-74 (2001); Meurer, supra note 36, at 521.
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credit rating, its relationship with customers, and its reputation with
investors, regardless of how the suit is ultimately resolved. By suing
less-established firms, critics say, predatory plaintiffs can use litigation
to threaten their survival.98 Observers call companies who assert
weak patents in such a context patent bullies.99
Verizon's suit against Vonage provides a case study. 00 Vonage, a
pioneering internet telephone company, presented a competitive
threat to Verizon, a telecommunications giant.' When Verizon sued
Vonage for patent infringement, it was described as the attempt of a
"deep-pocketed incumbent to drive an innovative competitor out of
business."'0 2 The court ruled that Vonage's products were infringing
three of Verizon's patents and ordered Vonage to pay $58 million, a
significant setback to its attempt to turn a profit. °3 The court also
enjoined Vonage from signing new customers,"° which Vonage was
quoted as saying would amount to its "slow death."'0 5 Ultimately, the
injunction was stayed by the Federal Circuit0 6 and did not succeed in
driving Vonage out of business, as was feared.0 7 Still, it and suits by
other incumbents have continued to burden Vonage. 0 8
While some call this type of suit "opportunistic,"' 0'9 there's
another side to the story. Verizon invests heavily in research and
98. Meurer, supra note 36, at 523-24.
99. Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1063, 1080 (2008).
100. Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir.
2007); Graham & Sichelman, supra note 99, at 1080-81.
101. Graham & Sichelman, supra note 99, at 1080.
102. Timothy B. Lee, Vonage Is the Latest Victim of Patent Abuse, THE AMERICAN,
Apr. 24, 2007, http://www.american.com/archive/2007/april-O407/vonage-is-the-latest-
victim-of-patent-abuse.
103. Verizon Servs. Corp., 503 F.3d at 1301-02; Marguerite Reardon, Vonage to Pay
$58 Million in Verizon Patent Case, CNET NEWS, Mar. 8, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/2100-
1036_3-6165747.html.
104. Anne Broache, Marguerite Reardon & Declan McCullagh, After Setback, Vonage
Wins Temporary Relief, CNET NEWS, Apr. 6, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1036_3-
6173991.html.
105. Matthew Barakat, Vonage Injunction Stayed in Patent Case, USA TODAY, Apr.
24, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/techinvestor/industry/2007-04-24-vonage-stay_
N.htm.
106. Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 228 Fed. Appx. 986, 986 (Fed.
Cir. Apr. 24, 2007); CAFC Stays Permanent Injunction Against Vonage Pending Appeal,
Patently-O Patent Law Blog, Apr. 25, 2007, http://patentlyo.comlpatent/2007/04/vonage-
getssta.html.
107. Timothy B. Lee, A Patent Lie, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2007, at A15.
108. See Graham & Sichelman, supra note 99, at 1080-81 (describing litigation brought
by AT&T and Sprint, in addition to Verizon).
109. Meurer, supra note 36, at 509.
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development with a laboratory of 350 to 400 researchers.1"' Verizon's
suit could fairly be characterized as a way for it to secure a return on
its investments in innovation. In addition, some might argue
predatory suits simply represent an exercise by large companies of
their competitive advantages in intellectual property.
Although patent predation has received relatively little scholarly
attention, several aspects of the Vonage case reinforce what others
have observed. First, predation strategies appear to be more common
in high-tech industries like internet telephony.'' This may be
because innovation in those industries is incremental, thereby
increasing the risk that a new entrant will tread upon previous
advances. 112  Second, injunctions appear to provide a particularly
potent weapon for carrying out predatory strategies. 113 Their potency
is one reason that predatory patent litigation is regarded as "more
likely to succeed" than other predatory tactics.'
14
6. Limited Stakes, Small Company v. Large Company, and
University Suits
The above stories represent what I consider to be the dominant
categories of high-tech patent litigation. But many suits do not fit
into any of them. In this Section, I describe three additional types of
litigation: limited stakes, small v. large company, and university suits.
We tracked such suits as well in our study.
Some patent suits represent garden variety business disputes
between small- and medium-sized companies. While many
companies are small- or medium-sized," 5 they have less revenue than
large companies. This sets a relatively lower limit on the value at
stake in patent disputes between them, making them limited stakes.
Other patent suits take the form of a small company suing a large
company. Small company plaintiffs resemble individual and NPE
plaintiffs insofar as their exposure to counterclaims is limited. In
addition, because of the difficulties of identifying NPEs described
110. Toby Weber, Blinding Them with Science, TELEPHONY ONLINE, Jul. 23, 2001
http://telephonyonline.com/mag/telecom blinding-science/.
111. See Meurer, supra note 36, at 523.
112. See Lee, supra note 102; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 1994-96.
113. See Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 97, at 573.
114. Meurer, supra note 36, at 516.
115. Of the private company plaintiffs profiled by revenue in this dataset, for example,
we classified approximately 60% as small (annual revenue of less than $10 million), 26%
as medium-sized (annual revenue from $10 million-$100 million) with 22% of the 26%
having revenues of less than $50 million, and only 14% as large (annual revenue of over
$100 million).
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infra Part IV, some small company plaintiffs may in fact be NPEs, and
by extension, small company v. large company suits may represent
NPE suits.
Finally, some suits involve university patentees suing various
defendants."6 While scholars have carried out a number of studies on
university patenting,' 17 less academic attention has been paid to
university patent litigation. The important university patents seem to
be in biotechnology areas." 8 Though universities are generally large
entities, like NPEs, they have limited exposure because they do not
make products. In addition, public universities can assert a sovereign
immunity defense."9
B. Comparing the Narratives
These narratives can be matched to actual litigations based on
party profile (Fig. 1). Together with a team of research assistants, I
analyzed each dispute in two different ways-with respect to who
brought each suit, and also with respect to each suit's plaintiff-
defendant pair, or case-pairing. The first analysis was accomplished
by placing each party into one of a limited number of categories:
individual, NPE, nonprofit (university and other nonprofits), private
non-NPE company, and public non-NPE company.12° Many of the
plaintiffs or defendants in our sample were private companies, with a
wide range of company profiles. 1' Thus, we further classified each
116. For two examples, see Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916
(Fed. Cir. 2004) and In re Columbia Univ. Patent Litig., 343 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Mass.
2004).
117. For a review of the studies analyzing university patenting, see generally Nicola
Baldini, University Patenting and Licensing Activity: A Review of the Literature, RES.
EVALUATION, Dec. 2006, at 197, 197.
118. See, for example, the patents that were the subject of the cases listed supra note
116.
119. The Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that "[t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State
.... * U.S. CONST amend. XI; see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999) (holding invalid the attempt of the Patent and
Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act to expressly abrogate the States'
sovereign immunity). For a discussion of whether the sovereign immunity defense should
apply in patent disputes, see Eugene Volokh, Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual
Property, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1161 (2000).
120. For a detailed description of the party categories, see infra Appendix A.
121. For instance, Freescale Semiconductor is privately held and, according to its
website, employs 24,000 people with FY2007 worldwide revenues of $5.7 billion. See
Freescale, About Freescale, http://www.freescale.com/webapp/sps/site/homepage.jsp?
nodeld=06 (last visited Apr. 29, 2009). In contrast, the private company Adesso
Technology is estimated to have twenty employees and annual revenues of $3.7 million.
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private company as small, medium, or large based on available
revenue information reported on the Hoovers.com website (premium
edition). In order to carry out the second analysis, matching the suits
to the stories, we profiled each suit based on plaintiff-defendant pair
and then matched each suit profile to the narrative that best matched
it. We also recorded duration data for completed suits.
As noted before, previous discussions of patent litigation tend to
focus on one or a few litigation stories in isolation. The present
analysis, in contrast, analyzes different types of suits together and
attempts to provide an empirical context for comparing them.
Figure 1 presents a stylized framework for thinking of these types of
suits.
Figure 1: Narratives of Patent Litigation
NPE
David v. Goliath Defensive Patenting
Small v. Large Sport of Kings
Limited Stakes Predation
Defendant
Size
Plaintiff
Size/ Exposure
Small plaintiff-large defendant
Several litigation stories fit within the case pairing of small
plaintiff-large defendant. David v. Goliath suits, for instance, feature
an individual inventor suing a corporation. Most NPE suits, which pit
small licensing shops against mature, well-established companies, also
fit the small plaintiff-large defendant profile. Not all NPEs are small,
however-well-known NPE Acacia Research Corporation122  is
See Adesso Technology Inc., Company Overview, Hoover's, http://www.hoovers.com/
Adesso-Technology-Inc./--HD xcktsxtsj,src _dbi--/free-co-dnbfactsheet.xhtml (last
visited Apr. 29, 2009).
122. The Acacia Research Corporation is listed on NASDAQ under the symbol
ACTG.
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publicly traded with a multi-million dollar market capitalization. 23 In
the present analysis, suits brought by an NPE, as well as suits for
declaratory judgment brought against NPEs, were characterized as
NPE suits regardless of the size of the parties. Finally, cases brought
by small private companies against public or large private ones, or so-
called small v. large suits, also fit this case pairing.
Large plaintiff-large defendant
This Article has described two ways in which large plaintiff-large
defendant disputes may resolve. If defensive patenting is successful,
most suits between such players should be avoided and instead result,
at most, in cross-licensing. However, in some cases, companies may
also choose to follow an offensive strategy of suing other large
companies who may or may not also be competitors. Such sport of
kings suits are more likely to be complex and potentially protracted,
with claims of infringement on both sides.
Large plaintiff-small defendant
Predatory plaintiffs target less financially-established defendants.
The typical predatory suit, therefore, features a large firm suing a
small one. Cases with this profile are identified in this Article as
having a predation profile. This coding has limitations, however.
Predatory suits are hard to identify based on profile alone, since they
require the plaintiff's intent to impose financial distress on the
defendant. In addition, a company does not necessarily need to be
large to engage in predation. One account describes a "company of
modest size using a high-profile ... law firm ... to go after
[seventeen] tiny companies and individuals" in an attempt to "extract
settlements from little guys with the threat of astronomical legal
costs. ' 124 This suit may be predatory even though it doesn't fit the
classic large v. small company profile. 25
Small/medium plaintiff-small/medium defendant
Limited stakes litigation, brought by small- or medium-sized
plaintiffs against small- or medium-sized defendants, fit in the lower
left hand quadrant. Even in cases where the stakes are low, the costs
of litigation remain high-for suits in which less than $1 million is at
123. See Acacia Research Corporation, Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com/q?
s=ACTG (last visited Apr. 27, 2009) (listing a market cap of $134.4 million on April 27,
2009).
124. Brian Kahin, Under the Radar: Two Tales From the Secret Life of Patents,
HUFFINGTON POST, July 25, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.comlbrian-kahin/under-the-
radar-two-tales_b_115022.html.
125. Id.
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risk, the average price tag is $461,000 per suit to the end of discovery,
and $767,000 to the conclusion of the suit. 126
What does the empirical data tell us about the relative
prevalence of these different types of suits? Part II describes how we
obtained the data to classify suits into different categories to address
this question, and Part III sets out the answers the data provides.
II. DATA AND METHODS
To develop a profile of litigation behavior in various computer-
related industries, I used data from the Stanford IPLC.127 The IPLC
includes all patent infringement lawsuits, including declaratory
judgment suits for noninfringement filed from January 1, 2000 to the
present. The underlying data is derived from Public Access to Court
Electronic Records ("PACER"), an electronic reporting service of
the United States court system.12' Based on a manual checking
process, the IPLC excludes false positive cases (e.g., miscoded cases,
patent licensing cases, etc.) and includes false negative cases
(infringement cases never before coded as such).129
I selected cases filed between January 1, 2000 and March 21, 2008
involving hardware, software, and financial patents based on the
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") patent
classification of the litigated patents, as coded by the IPLC.13°
Scholars have used a variety of different criteria to select patents
belonging to various industries, each with its own shortcomings.
Selecting patent and litigation cases based on company,' for
instance, can blur the distinction between industry sectors, as large
companies often have multiple lines of business. For example,
126. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. L. ASS'N, supra note 69, at 1-91.
127. For an overview of the IPLC, see generally Press Release, Stanford Law School,
Stanford Law School Launches Intellectual Property Litigation Clearinghouse (Dec. 8,
2008), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/programlcenters/iplc/ (follow "Press
Releases" hyperlink).
128. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, PACER Service Center,
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
129. E-mail from J.H. Walker, Executive Director, IP Lit. Clearinghouse, Stanford
Law School, to author (Oct. 10, 2008, 11:35 EST) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); see also Mark A. Lemley & J.H. Walker, Intellectual Property Litigation
Clearinghouse: Data Overview 1 (2007 Kauffman Symposium on Entrepreneurship and
Innovation Data, Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper No. 1024032, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024032 (indicating that research assistants manually check the
IPLC data).
130. For a detailed description of the definitions used in this study, see infra Appendix
B.
131. See, e.g., Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 61, at 3-4.
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General Electric has diversified beyond power generation into fields
ranging from medical imaging to media content to financial
services,132 defying attempts to classify it into a single industry. Meta
classifications that aggregate USPTO classifications, such as those
offered by the National Bureau of Economic Research, are generally
too large to facilitate in-depth study of particular industries.'33
However, on the opposite extreme, studies based on manually
reading and classifying each patent yields a classification scheme that
cannot be replicated, thereby making comparisons with other
analyses difficult. 134  Selecting patent and litigation cases based on
keyword searching of the claim language is likely to be more precise
but is prone to produce under or overinclusive results depending on
the keywords selected.'35
Table 1: Data-Description of High-Tech Patents
by Industry and Year
Industry Suits137  Year of Number
Category 136 Suit of Suits
Financial 513 2000- 205
2001
Hardware 589 2002- 444
2003
Software 1512 2004- 690
2005
2006- 961
2008
Total 2,300
132. GE Products & Services Index: Listing of GE products and GE businesses,
http://www.ge.com/products-services/directory/by-product.html (last visited Apr. 29,
2009).
133. The National Bureau of Economic Research uses six main technological
categories: Computers and Communications, Drugs and Medical, Electrical and
Electronics, Chemical, Mechanical, and Others. Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe &
Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights, and
Methodological Tools 1 (NBER Working Paper Series, Paper No. 8498, 2001), available at
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8498.pdf. This approach has been described as "rather
crude." Allison et al., supra note 60, at 472.
134. E.g., Allison et al., supra note 60, at 443-48.
135. See, e.g., Bessen & Hunt, supra note 62, at 8-10.
136. See infra notes 139-41 for the specific USPTO classifications for each category.
137. A number of suits fit into more than one industry category, but the total number
of unique cases in the dataset was 2,300.
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For this analysis, I applied a compromise approach of selecting a
limited number of USPTO classes that describe computer-related
hardware, software, and financial inventions.138  The hardware
category includes patents classified by the USPTO as covering
semiconductor technologies, memory, and digital processing (chip)
architectures and design.'39 The software category includes patents
covering user interfaces, database technology, software development,
computer graphics, and cryptography. 4 The financial inventions
category includes patents classified by the USPTO as financial
process, business practice, management, or cost/price determination
data processing inventions.14' Though USPTO classification schemes
have also been criticized for misclassifying cases into one class rather
than another,' I limited the impact of any misclassification by
aggregating related classes.
138. This decision was informed by my experiences prosecuting patents in these fields
while a patent practitioner at a California-based technology law firm.
139. Included in the hardware category are the following USPTO classifications: 716
(Data Processing: Design and Analysis of Circuit or Semiconductor Mask), 385 (Optical
Waveguides), 712 (Electrical Computers and Digital Processing Systems: Processing
Architectures and Instruction Processing (e.g., processors)), 438 (Semiconductor Device
Manufacturing: Process), 257 (Active Solid-State Devices (e.g., transistors, solid-state
diodes)), and 340 (Communications: Electrical).
140. Included in the software category are the following USPTO classifications:
Classes 703 (Data Processing: Structural Design, Modeling, Simulation, and Emulation),
717 (Data Processing: Software Development, Installation, and Management), 324
(Electricity: Measuring and Testing), 369 (Dynamic Information Storage or Retrieval),
700 (Data Processing: Generic Control Systems or Specific Applications), 701 (Data
Processing: Vehicles, Navigation, and Relative Location), 709 (Electrical Computers and
Digital Processing Systems: Multicomputer Data Transferring), 704 (Data Processing:
Speech Signal Processing, Linguistics, Language Translation, and Audio
Compression/Decompression), 711 (Electrical Computers and Digital Processing Systems:
Memory), 713 (Electrical Computers and Digital Processing Systems: Support), 710
(Electrical Computers and Digital Data Processing Systems: Input/Output), 345
(Computer Graphics Processing and Selective Visual Display Systems), 715 (Data
Processing: Presentation Processing of Document, Operator Interface Processing, and
Screen Saver Display Processing), and 707 (Data Processing: Database and File
Management or Data Structures). In 2004, Graham and Mowery did a study of software
patents based on the list of USPTO classes, three-quarters of which are included in the
current sample. Stuart J.H. Graham & David C. Mowery, Software Patents: Good News
or Bad News? 14 (GaTech TI:GER Working Paper Series, 2004), available at
http://tiger.gatech.edu/files/ gt-tiger-software.pdf.
141. The entire financial inventions category is composed of one USPTO classification:
Class 705 (Data Processing: Financial, Business Practice, Management, or Cost/Price
Determination).
142. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An
Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REv. 2099, 2114 (2000) ("We
were not content to rely on the PTO classification system, . .. [as] we did not find it
particularly reliable. In the course of this study, we came upon numerous instances of
what appear to us to be wrong or arbitrary classification decisions.").
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This approach yielded a total of 2,300 unique high-tech patent
litigation cases (Table 1). Around 300 of the cases were classified by
the IPLC into more than one class, yielding some duplicates between
each of the three industry categories. Thus, I created two databases:
one of unique cases, which I used to generate the summary statistics
found in this Article, and a database containing cases associated with
each reported class, including duplicates, which I used to calculate the
industry category statistics reported in this Article.
A team of research assistants and I profiled each litigation based
on the plaintiffs and defendants named in each case. Each party was
placed into one of a limited number of categories: public company,
NPE, individual, non-profit, and private company. Private companies
were further coded as small, medium, or large based on revenue data,
where available, as described supra Part I.B.
The definitions and methods of identification are described in
detail in Appendix B. Generally, however, we identified public
companies, including their subsidiaries, based on the profile
information provided by the Edgar database of the Securities and
Exchange Commission.143  We identified universities and
governments by name and placed them together with nonprofit
organizations identified by their websites in the category of nonprofit.
We coded parties as individuals if the first named party was an
individual, including individuals listed as "dba" (doing business as) a
corporate entity.
We identified parties as NPEs if the entity was described by a
court description, industry code, news article, entity website, or blog
post as a non-practicing enforcement/licensing entity, NPE, or troll.
When a company described as an NPE also fit into another category,
it was placed in the NPE category. This methodology is conservative
for several reasons. First, many licensing shops do not advertise,
making it difficult to verify what they do.1" We coded entities for
which we found no information about the company's operations as
private companies, when in fact some may be licensing companies.
Second, when an individual's name comprised the first named party,
we coded the party as an individual. Yet, as described earlier, some
of these suits are likely funded by non-practicing
enforcement/licensing entities.
143. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Filings & Forms, http://www.sec.gov/
edgar.shtml (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
144. For example, NTP, the licensing entity that sued Research in Motion, does not
have a website.
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We classified companies that did not fit into any of the
aforementioned categories as private corporations. We generally
confirmed the private company status of these companies by
referencing the company website, complaints posted to the IPLC or
PACER, or other Internet description. We classified companies with
revenues less than $10 million as small, companies with annual
revenues between $10 million and $100 million as medium, and
companies that made more than $100 million annually as large. 145
The $10 million threshold is based on values published by the Small
Business Administration and previous empirical research, 146 and the
$100 million threshold is based on a calculation performed on high-
tech Russell 3000® companies. 147 After the initial coding was
complete, we performed quality checks to ensure accuracy.
Where an individual party belonged to several classes, we used a
hierarchy to place it into the most specific applicable category. Thus,
NPEs and universities/nonprofits were identified and coded first.
Public companies and individuals were coded next. If the party fell
into none of these categories, it was classified as a private company.
In a subset of cases, there were multiple plaintiffs or defendants.
This information was captured in two ways. First, we counted and
recorded the number of defendants. In doing so, we attempted to
determine the number of distinct, rather than individual, defendants.
This mattered most in cases where individuals were named in
addition to their corporate identity or alter ego14s or where multiple
corporate entities all belonging to the same parent entity were
145. Ball and Kesan use a similar set of ranges to define companies as small, medium
and large, except that their large category only includes companies with annual revenue of
$500 million or more. Ball & Kesan, supra note 54, at 11.
146. Id.; see also Small Business Administration, Size Standards, http://www.sba.gov/
contractingopportunities/officials/size/SUMMSIZESTANDARDSINDUSTRY.html
(last visited Apr. 29, 2009) (describing a wide range of revenue thresholds for a variety of
industries but stating that $7 million in average annual receipts is the "widely used size
standard" for defining nonmanufacturing industries).
147. Ninety percent of high-technology companies in the Russell 3000® index had
trailing twelve month revenues of $100 million and above based on data retrieved in
February 2009. I defined high-tech companies as those included in the following industry
groups, as identified by the Russell 3000®: Computers, Telecommunications, Electric,
Electronics, Semiconductors, Internet, Software, & Diversified Financial Services
industries. The Russell 3000® index measures the performance of the largest 3,000 public
companies. Russell 3000® Index, http://www.russell.com/Indexes/characteristics fact_
sheets/us/Russell_3000_Index.asp (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
148. For example, Stephen Conner and The Conner Group were counted as a single
defendant.
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named. 49 I used this information to generate statistics based on the
number of defendants in cases filed and to supplement the data on
the absolute number of cases filed. This was done to give another
view of the litigation burden associated with each dispute, as a single
suit may impose costs on many defendants.
Second, the analysis assumed that among multiple co-parties to a
suit, the largest entity was the real target or promulgator (or at least
the deep pocket) of the suit. For example, when a suit was brought
against an individual person and corporate or university defendant,
the defendant group was profiled according to the corporate or
university defendant. I used the party profiles to generate case
pairings, for example, individual v. public company or nonprofit v.
private company. Duration information for each suit was also
captured based on IPLC coding of the start and end dates of
litigation. Non-terminated cases were not included in the duration
analysis.
Based on this data, we generated statistics to present a snapshot
of (1) who brings lawsuits, and (2) the prevalence of various litigation
stories or narratives. To determine the prevalence of each narrative,
I matched each case pairing to the narrative that best approximated
it. The definitions we applied to the cases are summarized in Table 2
and described in greater detail in Appendix B.
149. For example, Daimler Benz AG and Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC were coded as a
single defendant.
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Table 2: Case Pairing Definitions
Term
NPE ut Drougnt Dy an N FL, or iJ suit Drougnt
against an NPE
Sport of Suit brought by a public or large private
Kings company against a public or large private
company
Suit brought by an individual against a public
David v. or large private company, or DJ suit brought
Goliath by a public or large private company against
an individual
University/ Suit brought by a university or nonprofit
Nonprofit
suits
Non-DJ suit brought by a public or large
Predation private company against a small private
Profile company, or a DJ suit brought by a smallprivate company against a public or large
private company
Non-DJ suit brought by a small private
Small v. company against a public or large privatecompany, or a DJ suit brought by a public orLarge large private company against a small private
company
Limited Suit brought by a small- or medium-sizedStakes private company against a small- or medium-
sized private company
Suit that does not fall into the above
categories
Some suits were for declaratory relief, reversing the normal
posture of parties. Suits that name NPEs as defendants, for instance,
commonly seek a declaration of non-infringement. To ensure that
cases were placed in the correct category, we checked the declaratory
judgment ("DJ") status of cases that presented potential coding
errors. To do so, we read the complaints of a sample of cases that fell
into each category (based on a 95% confidence rate with a 5%
confidence interval) and classified them as DJ or non-DJ cases.150
150. For a number of categories, the declaratory judgment status of a case did not
impact its profile coding. Sport of kings suits, for instance, involve large companies suing
each other, and limited stakes suits involve small- and medium-sized parties suing each
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III. RESULTS
A. Who Brings High-Tech Patent Lawsuits?
Despite the scrutiny computer-related patents have received,
attention has generally been focused elsewhere than on the simple
question: who brings high-tech patent suits? Table 3 reports the
answer to this question: by and large, non-NPE corporations do.
76% of all suits were brought by public or private corporations, and
among industries, the range was 71-84%. Individuals initiated 5% of
suits and nonprofits 1%.151 That left the NPE share at 17%, including
8% of all hardware suits and 23% of all financial suits.
Table 3: Cases by Plaintiff,
Calculated Based on Absolute Number of Suits
Plin~fC. tgory HadwreSotwr Financial All Suits
NPE 8% 20% 23% 17%
Non-NPE Public 50% 41% 30% 39%Corporation
Non-NPE Private
Corporation152 34% 34% 41% 37%
" Large ($100 4% 3% 3% 3%
million+)
" Medium ($10- 6% 4% 6% 5%
$100 million)
" Small (<$10 13% 11% 10% 12%
million)
Individual 6% 4% 5% 5%
Nonprofit 2% 1% 1% 1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Given the amount of attention NPEs have received, one might
expect NPE suits to comprise a greater share of high-tech patent
other; thus, the declaratory judgment status of these cases is irrelevant. In addition, I
assumed cases brought by NPEs, as well as those brought by individuals, were not for
declaratory relief.
151. Accord Ball & Kesan, supra note 54, at 12 (explaining that "universities were not
highly active in litigation" and that universities never pursued litigation without a co-
plaintiff).
152. Private companies for whom no revenue data was available were not placed into
any category, representing about 17% of plaintiffs.
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disputes. Instead, the statistics in Table 3 seem to confirm what
others have found:15 3 that NPEs have brought less than one-fifth of
the patent suits studied.
However, a closer look at the suits themselves tells a different
story. When they sue, NPEs typically name multiple defendants, each
of whom faces the prospect of being part of an ongoing litigation.
Past studies of patent litigation have failed to take this into account,
focusing solely on the absolute number of suits. Yet, every suit
brought against multiple defendants takes its toll on each defendant.
To account for this, we also calculated the number of cases brought
based on the number of defendants named.154 Accordingly, a suit
against three defendants was counted three times, while a suit against
one defendant was counted once. As described earlier, we attempted
to count only distinct defendants, for instance, counting multiple
named corporate entities all belonging to the same parent entity as a
single defendant.'55
Table 4: Cases by Plaintiff,
Calculated Based on Number of Defendants Sued
Plaintiff Category Hardware Softwre, .Fiacl All Sis
NPE 13% 30% 40% 26%
Non-NPE Public 44% 31% 17% 30%
Corporation
Non-NPE Private 31% 31% 36% 35%
Corporation
Individual 9% 7% 6% 8%
Nonprofit 3% 0% 0% 1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Based on this methodology,156 the average share of cases brought
by NPEs grew to 26%, putting it on par with public and private
corporations.157  More strikingly, of all suits involving financial
153. Namely, the statistics in Table 3 correspond to those found by Ball & Kesan (5%)
and Patent Freedom (12%). See supra text accompanying notes 54-55. Note, however,
that those figures are not industry specific.
154. See supra Table 2.
155. See supra notes 148-49.
156. See supra Table 4.
157. The mean number of defendants in NPE cases was 3.4, and the median was 2.0.
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patents, trolls initiated 40%, the largest single share. In software,
NPEs brought 30% of suits, and in hardware, 13% of suits.
The percentage of suits brought by individuals also grew when
the number of defendants was counted. 5  This indicates that
individuals are naming more than the average number of defendants
in each lawsuit. In this way, individuals are behaving more like NPEs
and less like corporations (whose shares dropped) in terms of the
number of defendants they name.
B. What Types of Suits Are Most Prevalent?
We looked at plaintiff-defendant pairs, matched them to the suit
stories described earlier, and considered what types of suits were
most prevalent. As described earlier,"5 9 where we suspected that the
DJ status of a case would impact its classification (for instance, cases
brought against trolls and individuals), we used a sample to place suits
into the correct category.
In addition, about 20% of the suits were brought by or against
parties for which no revenue information was available. For the
purposes of classifying suits into a case category only, we adopted the
assumption of Ball and Kesan that such companies were small due to
their limited footprint. 6 ° This assumption is supported in our study by
the predominance of small companies among the private companies
we studied for which revenue information was available-82% had
less than $50 million in annual revenue. 6' This assumption
influenced the outcomes principally by increasing the share of limited
stakes, predation profile, and small v. large suits, and decreasing the
share of sport of king suits. 6 2 The data are reported in Table 5.
158. The mean number of defendants in suits brought by individuals was 3.3, and the
median was 1.0.
159. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
160. See Ball & Kesan, supra note 54, at 11.
161. See supra note 115.
162. If cases where no revenue was available for a private party were removed from
the dataset, rather than assumed to be small, the values would be: 24% NPE, 5% David v.
Goliath, 10% small v. large, 41% sport of kings, 7% limited stakes, 4% predation profile,
2% nonprofit, and 6% other.
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Table 5: Lawsuits by Category,
Calculated Based on Absolute Numbers of Suits63
1603
Suit Category Hardware Software Financial Al Suits
NPE 9% 21% 26% 19%
David v. Goliath 5% 3% 3% 4%
Small v. Large 15% 17% 18% 18%
Sport of Kings 38% 36% 19% 28%
Limited Stakes 17% 11% 19% 16%
Predation Profile 10% 7% 7% 8%
Nonprofit 2% 1% 3% 2%
Other 4% 5% 5% 5%
Among the results, a few are striking. It appears that many
disputes initiated by large companies, that is, public companies and
large private companies in the dataset, are brought against other large
companies. Twenty-eight percent of all suits, the largest share, fit this
sport of kings profile. This in itself may not seem surprising; the bulk
of software patents are owned by corporations,164 many of them large
corporations, and the same is likely true of hardware patents. But
when the various litigation narratives are compared,165 the contrast
between perception and reality becomes more pronounced.
NPEs are known as willing, if not eager, litigants, having built a
business around patent enforcement. 166 In contrast, public high-tech
companies are generally portrayed as reluctant litigants, carefully
constructing portfolios of patents to avoid going to court. One might
therefore expect to see relatively fewer suits in the sport of kings
category and more suits in the NPE category. As reported in Table 5,
however, the opposite is true-overall, NPE suits comprised only
19% of the total, as compared to the 28% share of sport of kings suits.
This difference is statistically significant. 167 This means that when a
163. When calculated based on numbers of defendants sued, the results were, for NPE,
David v. Goliath, small v. large, sport of kings, limited stakes, predation profile, nonprofit,
and other categories, respectively, 28%, 5%, 19%, 21%, 16%, 7%, 1%, and 4%,
respectively.
164. Bessen & Hunt, supra note 62, at 3-4.
165. See supra Table 3.
166. Lerer, supra note 32 (citing an NPE's reputation as an aggressive litigator who is
"quick on the trigger" as responsible for bringing in settlements). For conflicting opinions
regarding whether this is really the case, see discussion supra Part II.A.I.
167. I used a standard chi-square test to examine the null hypothesis that NPE and
sport of king suits were equally likely to be filed, yielding a p-value of 6.1 x e-13. A p-
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suit was brought naming a public or large private company defendant,
the plaintiff-patentee was much more likely to be another large
company than an NPE. Notably, the trend was exaggerated in the
case of hardware patents (38% sport of kings vs. 9% NPE) and
reversed in the case of financial patents (19% sport of kings vs. 26%
NPE).
The share of NPE suits over the eight year period (19%) was
greater than the share of suits in which NPEs were plaintiffs (17%),
as reported in Table 3. This difference is attributable to DJ cases
brought against NPEs, which comprised some 2% of the total. Yet
other figures are also relevant. Based on a methodology that counts
the number of defendants (not shown), for instance, the share of NPE
suits jumps to 28%. In addition, as shown in Figure 2, the share of
NPE suits appears to be rising over time. During the 2000-2001
period, NPE suits accounted for 10% of the total, but double that,
20% of suits brought in 2006-2008 based on absolute count.
Counting defendants, the NPE suit share was 22% in 2000-2001 and
36% in 2006-2008. As observed before, the NPE phenomenon seems
to be most pronounced in the financial industry, followed by the
software industry; it was least important in the hardware industry.
Figure 2: NPE Suits168
i 4 0%
35%
30%
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. 201/6
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Years
- . % based on number of suits - % based on number of defendants
value of less than 0.05 is generally interpreted as an indication that the null hypothesis can
be rejected (making it statistically significant), while a value greater than 0.10 is viewed as
showing that any differences are not statistically significant.
168. Data points shown: 10%, 16%, 16%, 20% (based on number of suits); 22%, 25%,
21%, 36% (based on number of defendants).
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The remaining suits took various forms. 18% of suits were
brought by small companies against large ones, comparable to the
share of NPE suits (19%). As discussed earlier, due to the difficulties
of identifying NPEs, some of these suits may actually be NPE suits.
69
16% of the suits were limited stakes contests between small- and
medium-sized parties. In addition, suits by large companies against
small ones-so called predatory profile suits-comprised 8% of all
suits. This is not an insignificant share, and is double the share of
David v. Goliath suits (4%). Nonprofit/university suits represented a
small share of the total (2%).
C. How Long Do High-Tech Patent Lawsuits Last?
Beyond the initial point of filing, what happened once suits were
filed? The burdens associated with a lawsuit can vary tremendously,
depending on how far the dispute continues before it terminates,
either through court adjudication, settlement, or other resolution.
Table 6: Average Suit Duration
Category Months
NPE Suit 9.1
David v. Goliath 14.6
Small v. Large 11.4
Sport of Kings 14.0
Limited Stakes 11.2
Predation Profile 13.3
In order to estimate the fates of different types of suits, we
calculated how long they lasted.7 ° There was wide variation. Sport
of king suits lasted 14.0 months on average while NPE suits tended to
be resolved more quickly, lasting only 9.1 months. Suits brought by
individual inventors lasted around 14.6 months on average, longer
than suits brought by public companies against each other.
On the surface, this data seems to support some of the stories of
litigation that are told. That NPE suits resolve the most quickly of
any category is broadly consistent with the objective of obtaining a
settlement rather than winning. In contrast, the relatively long
169. However, given the very different distribution of these suits across industries as
compared to NPE suits and our confirmation that many of these small companies were
operating, it's unlikely most of them are.
170. See supra Table 4.
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duration of David v. Goliath suits seems consistent with a motivation
of vindication, not just financial gain. Yet it could be something much
simpler-merely that NPEs file in faster jurisdictions. Still, it is likely
that some NPE suits are settling early, according to one of several
dynamics. In cases where an NPE abandons its case or reduces its
target settlement to avoid substantial litigation after filing, an NPE's
bark may prove to be worse than its bite. In other cases, however, an
NPE may drive settlement through aggressive litigation tactics that
are meant to intimidate its opponents. Thus, the duration figures
reported here would seem to provide a starting point and some clues
for further research, rather than the basis for any strong conclusions.
IV. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This Article presents a snapshot of the litigation of computer-
related patents. It reports relative trends and does not address what
may comprise an "optimal" level of overall patent litigation. While
patent defendants in general would prefer less litigation, at least filed
against them, most would probably agree that a meaningful court
remedy is an essential part of a functioning patent system.
With these caveats in mind, four findings are worth further
discussion and possible research.
A. The Limits of Defensive Patenting
Large private and public corporations initiated 42% of all
lawsuits studied. These suits were against other large private and
public corporations 28% of the time. If large companies are amassing
portfolios of patents with the objective of avoiding litigation, why are
they involved in so many lawsuits?
One obvious reason large companies are in court is that
individuals, NPEs, and small companies are suing them. Defensive
patenting is not intended to, nor does it, guard against lawsuits
brought by plaintiffs with little, if any, product revenue. Such suits
are explored further below in the discussion of asymmetric stakes.
Several other factors may explain the relatively large number of
suits between large corporations. First, it may be that the number of
suits, though seeming large when compared to the number of suits
overall, is not that large relative to the size of the industries, the
amount of money at stake, and the levels of innovation. This study
does not measure the number of "avoided" suits or control for any of
these variables.
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In addition, defensive patenting is most effective when the
companies suing each other have overlapping patent and product
coverage. However, it may be that plaintiffs are suing in areas in
which they don't operate. The plaintiff may have acquired the patent
at suit from another company or may be in the practice of filing
patents over inventions that never mature into products. Under such
conditions, the plaintiff's exposure would remain low, even in the face
of a portfolio of defendant patents.
The empirical findings of Bessen and Meurer seem to support
this hypothesis. They find that, in general, a substantial number of
suits between public companies involve firms that are not market
competitors or even technologically close. 7' According to their
research, 29% of the public company v. public company suits they
studied involved "true competitors" in the same industry, 43% had
overlapping product lines, and 28% had no industry overlap-not one
business segment in common at the three-digit SIC level. 72 Related,
companies may be suing those with whom they have one-off
interactions as opposed to those with whom they have repeated
interactions.173
To some extent, these and NPE suits represent failures of the
defensive patenting strategy, which is unable to deter against these
unexpected threats by companies with limited interaction in the
marketplace.
Finally, the relatively high levels of large company-initiated
litigation may reflect that many companies are not strictly following a
defensive patenting strategy. Companies that patent primarily for
defensive reasons may also engage in selective enforcement to build a
reputation for toughness that deters others from copying. Or they
may occasionally engage in strategic or predatory litigation. Finally,
companies' intentions with respect to patents may change over time.
As public companies in the sample, such as Rambus, turned from
operating to non-operating companies, for instance, their motives for
acquiring patents likely also shifted from defensive to offensive.
For all of these reasons, it does not appear that defensive
patenting is succeeding at preventing many companies with high-
technology patents from bringing or defending against patent suits.
An inquiry at the company level would likely lend further insights.
171. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 1, at 19.
172. Id. at 18; supra Table 3.
173. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 1, at 18.
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B. Counting NPEs
NPE plaintiffs initiate 17% of all suits (Table 2), yet, when
defendants are counted, the share was 26% (Table 3). Factoring in
declaratory judgments, the share rose to 28% (Table 4). In the 2006-
2008 period, this figure was 36% counting defendants and 20%
counting suits (Fig. 2). These numbers demonstrate that, when trying
to measure the NPE phenomenon, it matters how you count them.
While this study, unlike others, counts defendants, this methodology
is not necessarily better than counting cases. Counting defendants
arguably better captures the point of view of defendants who are
named in NPE suits. However, multi-defendant litigation differs in
many ways from single-defendant litigation and, in many cases,
reduces the pressure on a single defendant to, for instance, devise
theories for why the asserted patent is invalid.
Several other issues complicate the task of assigning a single,
definitive number to NPEs. Defining and identifying trolls is an
inexact science,'74 making it difficult to compare this Article's
estimates to others. Patent Freedom, for instance, reports that NPE
suits comprised around 12% of the total in 2006-2008'7 in
comparison with this Article's 20% figure for the 2006-March 2008
period. Because this 20% includes only high-tech suits, whereas
Patent Freedom's 12% is calculated across industries, these numbers
seem to confirm that NPEs have focused more on high-tech than
other inventions. But Patent Freedom also uses a different,
proprietary approach to counting NPEs, which it describes as
"necessarily incomplete,"'76 also accounting for some of the
difference. Finally, because both of these numbers focus solely on
litigation, they ignore threats that do not mature into lawsuits.'7 7 If
it's true that the proportion of patent threats to patent suits is higher
for NPEs than for other patentees, these and other studies that focus
solely on litigation understate the NPE phenomenon.
C. Patterns of Litigation by Industry
The data highlight the significant differences in patterns of
litigation between industries. NPEs appear to be relatively more
active in the litigation of financial inventions, bringing 26% (Table 5)
174. See supra Part I.A.1.
175. Patent Freedom, Current Research: Litigations Over Time, https://www.patent
freedom.com/research-lot.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
176. Id.
177. See infra note 186.
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of the suits studied. This figure rose to around 42% of the total when
suits were counted according to the number of defendants.178 This
suggests that NPEs are an important driver of the much higher rates
of litigation of financial inventions relative to other patents.1 79
NPEs accounted for a relatively smaller share of software patent
suits (21%)1' ° and an even smaller share of hardware suits (9%)."8
Why are NPEs more active in the litigation of financial patents?
Lerner speculates that the high rate of litigation of financial
inventions may be due, in part, to the substantial uncertainty
associated with financial patents." NPEs may be more willing to
exploit this uncertainty than corporations, leading to their share. Or,
perhaps corporations holding software and hardware patents are
more litigious than those holding software patents. The State Street
decision,83 which allowed companies to patent business methods, was
handed down in 1998, whereas hardware and certain software
inventions have been patentable since at least the early 1980s.11 Thus,
financial services companies have had a shorter period of time in
which to become familiar and comfortable with patent litigation than
their hardware and software counterparts.
Also notable was the significant share of sport of kings hardware
and software suits (38% and 36%, respectively). This suggests that
the objective of defensive patenting in these industries, as noted
above, is not being served.
178. This figure is based on the author's calculation.
179. Lerner, supra note 87, at 2 (reporting that financial patents are twenty-seven to
thirty-nine times more likely to be litigated than patents are generally).
180. This figure is derived from counting cases, not defendants.
181. Id.
182. Lerner, supra note 87, at 25.
183. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
184. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981).
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Figure 3: Narratives of Patent Litigation-Match to Evidence'
NPE (19%)
David v. Goliath (4%) Sport of Kings (28%)
Small v. Large (18%)
Limited Stakes (16%) Predation (8%)
Defendant
Size
Plaintiff
Size/ Exposure
D. Asymmetric Stakes
Finally, while much attention has been focused on NPEs,
several other categories of suits-David v. Goliath, and small v.
large-also feature a small plaintiff, with limited exposure, suing a
large defendant with greater exposure. Forty-one percent of all cases
fell into one of these "asymmetric stakes" categories-the single
largest quadrant share. Large companies may lump these types of
suits together, given their similarities. If that's the case, NPEs may be
getting more blame for opportunistic litigation than they are owed,
for cases brought by small operating companies and independent
inventor plaintiffs. However, why this number is so large is worth
further study. Whether it reflects the opportunism of small plaintiffs
and an exploitation of the asymmetries between parties, technology
transfer between small patentees and large operating companies, or
something else is unclear.
CONCLUSION
These theories suggest directions for future research. This
Article provides a high-level snapshot of litigation behavior but
leaves much to be explored at the company level. In addition, while
providing a robust discussion of different patent litigation narratives,
this study says little about the reported 99% patents that are never
185. Not shown: Nonprofit suits (2%) and Other Suits (5%). See supra Table 5.
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litigated or the 95% that are never licensed.186 Still, the snapshot
discussed here provides one way to talk about the different ways in
which the patent litigation system is being used, with reference to its
roles of incenting innovation and facilitating its development.
Deepening our understanding of patent litigation will provide a
perspective on whether or not the system is working and, based on
that, how it may be improved.
186. It is estimated that only 5% of patents are the subject of licensing and 1% of
litigation. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1495, 1507 n.55 (2001).
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APPENDIX A: PARTY CATEGORIES, DEFINITIONS, AND METHODS
OF IDENTIFICATION
Party Definition Methods of Identification 87
Category
Public Non-NPE, publicly- Checked internet sites tracking
Company traded company public company status primarily via
(including foreign http://www.sec.gov; and in some
exchanges) or cases, http://www.hoovers.com
subsidiary of same; (premium edition) and
also includes joint http://www.finance.yahoo.com
ventures owned by
public companies
Non-NPE corporate
patent enforcement
entity that neither
practices nor seeks to
develop its inventions
Looked for descriptions on the
internet of the entity's activities;
coded NPE where the entity was
described as a non-practicing
enforcement/licensing entity, NPE,
or troll; main sources included entity
website, court pleading or order,
SEC disclosure/description,
Hoover's line or description of
business, or press account; could be
owned by a corporation or nonprofit
Examples:
1) Court decision description:
"Synesi Group, Inc. is an inactive
Minnesota corporation that
currently has no assets. Synesi was
formed in 1999 for the purpose of
generating licensing revenue
through two patents, U.S. Patent
#6922720 and U.S. Patent #7020692
... "(http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/d
ata2/minnesotastatecases/appunpub/
0809/opa071868-0923.pdf)
187. Based on company name as listed by IPLC, and where needed, primary place of
business as identified in the complaint.
NPE
[Vol. 871612
LITIGATION OF HIGH-TECH PATENTS
Cttv I finitIin Methods of IdentificatiOnl'
Non-NPE corporate
patent enforcement
entity that neither
practices nor seeks to
develop its inventions
NPE
Individual Individual person First named plaintiff is an individual
(including individuals described as
"doing business as" as a corporate
entity)
188. Based on company name as listed
business as identified in the complaint.
by IPLC, and where needed, primary place of
2) Industry coding: Synchrome
Technology Inc's. industry identified
as "6794:Patent owners and lessors"
(http://O-premium.hoovers.com.
sculib.scu.edu/subscribe/basic/
factsheet.xhtml?ID=ksjfkskhs)
3) News article: List of IP Court
cases involving select non-practicing
entities, including F & G Research
Inc. (http://www.scienceprogress.
org/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/
issue2/mccurdy.pdf)
4) Entity website: in 1998, TVI
"reorganized as a patent licensing
company" (http://www.tvi.com/
index.htm)
5) Blog post: "ST Sales Tech
Holdings LLC v. Chrysler...
(Tyler, 7/24/07). Another entity
apparently related to the
Constellation companies. Although
this one isn't a child of Plutus (see
earlier entries)-it appears to be
directly owned by Erich
Spangenberg.... And now a
handful of companies have yet
another patent troll case to contend
with." (http://agoracom.com/ir/
patriot/forums/discussion/topics/147
635-troll-cases-pouring-into-eastern-
texas/messages/569392-Troll
Tracker)
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Party Definition Methods of Identification 89
Category
Nonprofit Non-NPE Nonprofit Entity represents a college,
entity university, government, or
recognized nonprofit engaging in
operating activity, confirmed at
entity website
Non-NPE, privately
held company or
subsidiary of same;
default category for
companies that do not
fit into any other
category
No confirmation that the company
was public, an NPE, an individual,
or a nonprofit based on the methods
described above. In most cases,
private company status confirmed
via company websites and press
accounts that company was selling
products
Private companies were further split
into the following size categories
based on estimated revenue figures
provided by Hoovers.com (premium
edition):
" Small private company (annual
revenues of less than $10
million)
" Medium private company
(annual revenues of from $10
million-$100 million)
" Large private company (annual
revenues of more than $100
million)
" Unknown (revenue information
not available)
189. Based on company name as listed by IPLC, and where needed, primary place of
business as identified in the complaint.
Private
Company
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APPENDIX B: SUIT CATEGORIES AND CASE-PAIRING DEFINITIONS
Narrative Definition
NPE Suit brought by an NPE, Cases where plaintiff is NPE +
or DJ suit brought DJ cases where defendant is
against an NPE NPE
Sport of Suit between two public Cases where both plaintiff and
Kings companies, or a public defendant are public or large
company and a large private company
private company
David v. Suit brought by an Non-DJ cases where plaintiff is
Goliath individual against a an individual and defendant is
public or large private a public/large private company
company, or DJ suit + DJ cases where plaintiff is a
brought by a public or public/large private company
large private company and defendant is an individual
against an individual
University/ Suit brought by a Nonprofit plaintiff
Nonprofit nonprofit
Suits
Predation Non-DJ suit brought by a Non-DJ cases where plaintiff is
public or large private public or large private
company against a small company and defendant is
private company, or a DJ small private company + DJ
suit brought by a small cases where plaintiff is small
private company against private company and defendant
a public or large private is public or large private
company company
Small v. Non-DJ suit brought by a Non-DJ cases where plaintiff is
Large small private company small private company and
against a public or large defendant is public or large
private company, or a DJ private company + DJ cases
suit brought by a public where plaintiff is public or
or large private company large private company and
against a small private defendant is small private
company company
Limited Suit between two small Cases where both plaintiff and
Stakes or medium-sized private defendant are individuals,
companies small, or medium-sized private
companies
Other Suit that does not fall Medium- or large-sized private
into the above categories companies v. medium- or large-
sized private companies
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